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Short abstract 
We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes 
between a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system. We argue that 
the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive, but also that 
both of them are still at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We use 
this distinction to interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology – 
arguing that neither animals nor infants can think and reason about time – and also to 
explain certain features of adult human cognition discussed in the philosophy of time 
and in the literature on intertemporal choice, respectively.  
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Long abstract 
We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes 
between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a 
temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is 
both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which 
are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main 
features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal 
updating system can support, and the respects in which it is more limited than the 
temporal reasoning system. We then use the distinction between the two systems to 
interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology, arguing that animals 
operate only with a temporal updating system and that children start out doing so too, 
before gradually becoming capable of thinking and reasoning about time. After this, 
we turn to adult human cognition and suggest that our account can also shed light on a 
specific feature of our everyday thinking about time that has been the subject of 
debate in the philosophy of time, which consists in a tendency to think about the 
nature of time itself in a way that appears ultimately self-contradictory. We conclude 
by considering the topic of intertemporal choice, and argue that drawing the 
distinction between temporal updating and temporal reasoning is also useful in the 
context of characterising two distinct mechanisms for delaying gratification.  
 
Keywords 
animal cognition, cognitive development, dual systems, mental time travel, 
metaphysics of time, planning, intertemporal choice, temporal reasoning, tense  
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Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition 
 
Is temporal cognition a basic, primitive ingredient in mental life, or is it a complex 
achievement requiring a great deal of cognitive sophistication? On the one hand, 
humans and animals are by necessity adept at timing their actions appropriately, at 
ensuring that sequences of actions unfold in the correct order, and at keeping track of 
changes in the environment that occur with temporal regularity. In that sense, both 
people and animals are inherently temporal creatures. On the other hand, the nature of 
time remains the subject of highly technical debates amongst metaphysicians and 
theoretical physicists (Bardon, 2013; Carroll, 2010), and different cultures have 
different systems for marking time, acquiring which requires explicit teaching and 
occurs over a protracted period of development (Aveni, 1989; Friedman, 1982; 
McCormack, 2015). In these respects, thinking about time is something that seems 
very difficult.   
 
It is by no means obvious that being able to think about time is something that is 
ontogenetically or phylogenetically primitive, despite animals’ and infants’ prowess 
at processing a variety of types of temporal information. The idea that animals are 
cognitively “stuck in time” has a long-standing history (Aristotle, 1930; Bergson, 
1911), and has been the subject of a considerable amount of research (for discussion, 
see Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003; Roberts, 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007; Zentall, 2005). Despite convincing evidence that animals can retain information 
about things that they have experienced in the past (e.g., Babb & Crystal, 2005; 
Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Eacott, Easton, & Zinkivskay, 2005) and act in ways that 
prepare them for situations that are yet to come (e.g., Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Osvath 
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& Osvath, 2008; Raby, Alexis, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007), there is still widespread 
disagreement about how to interpret this evidence. Similarly, the idea that children 
have limited ability to think and reason about time has a long-standing history 
(Fraisse, 1964; Piaget, 1969). Infants can process a variety of types of temporal 
information even from birth (e.g., de Hevia, Izard, Coubart, Spelke & Streri, 2014), 
toddlers are adept at learning about event order (Bauer, Hertsgaard, Dropik & Daly, 
1998), and the use of tense in language typically appears very early (Weist, 1989). 
Nevertheless, as we shall discuss, there are good reasons to believe that it takes 
several years before children can think about time as adults do. 
  
In this paper, we outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition and argue that 
it is useful not just for framing issues in comparative and developmental psychology 
but also in considering aspects of adult human cognition. We recognize that there is 
considerable debate about how the claims of such accounts should be interpreted, in 
particular whether it might be more appropriate to refer to dual processes rather than 
dual systems (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). We will not address these debates here, but 
instead identify four key claims that provide the basis for conceptualizing the 
distinction we want to make as a distinction between two systems: We claim (i) that 
one of these systems is less ontogenetically and phylogenetically primitive than the 
other, (ii) that one depends on experience and learning in a way the other does not, 
(iii) that one typically involves more cognitively effortful reasoning than the other, 
and (iv) that they co-exist and can potentially be in conflict, yielding contradictory 
beliefs or judgments. This set of claims is similar to sets of claims made in the context 
of other ‘dual systems’ accounts (Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 1996; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000), and for this reason we believe it is useful to adopt the same 
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terminology. Note, however, that in distinguishing between two systems we are not 
claiming that they have distinct and discrete neurological bases or operate entirely 
independently, and we acknowledge that there may be other ways of describing the 
distinction we make (e.g., as two sets of processes).  
  
Our dual systems approach to temporal cognition distinguishes between a temporal 
updating system and a temporal reasoning system. Abilities that have been studied 
under the heading of temporal cognition include a sensitivity to temporal duration, a 
sensitivity to repeating temporal periods, ways of keeping track of temporal order, 
and the ability to judge where in time events are located. What these diverse abilities 
have in common is that they are all used to solve tasks that involve things unfolding 
over time in a certain way. Such tasks may differ in ways that mean that they each 
require a somewhat different explanation of performance, e.g., because they involve 
different timescales (e.g., seconds versus years), or because they require a sensitivity 
to duration rather than succession. The distinction between temporal updating and 
temporal reasoning is intended as a more fundamental distinction that cuts across 
these differences. There is a basic reason why we want to make this distinction: we 
believe that there are a number of different tasks that involve things unfolding over 
time in a certain way that can be solved without the ability to represent and reason 
about time itself. The temporal updating system is sufficient to solve such tasks, 
whereas other tasks require the temporal reasoning system. We will first provide an 
outline characterization of each of the two systems and describe the types of behavior 
that the more primitive temporal updating system can support, but also describe its 
limitations. After this, we will use the distinction to interpret findings from the 
comparative and developmental literatures. To anticipate, we will argue that neither 
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animals nor infants can think and reason about time – they rely entirely on the 
temporal updating system, although in the case of children there is also an important 
developmental story to be told about the emergence of the temporal reasoning system. 
We will then turn to adult temporal cognition and suggest that our account can also 
shed light on a specific feature of adults’ everyday thinking about time that has been 
the subject of debate in the philosophy of time. We will conclude by considering the 
phenomenon of intertemporal choice and outlining a way in which the distinction 
between temporal updating and temporal reasoning bears on existing discussions of 
that phenomenon too. 
 
1. The two systems 
1.1 Temporal updating 
A creature capable of what we call temporal updating maintains a representation of 
how things are in its environment, which can be conceived of as map-like in so far as 
it contains information about locations, but which can also contain information about 
the existence of objects and features of those objects whilst leaving the location of 
those objects underdetermined. As things change over time, the creature will receive 
new information, and this information may contradict an aspect of its existing 
representation. But all the creature does in response to receiving such information, 
using the updating system, is change the relevant aspect of its representation of the 
environment. That is to say, crucial to the temporal updating system is that it deals 
with changing input by changing representations, rather than by representing change. 
If a change happens, it simply records the new, changed state of affairs, rather than 
also representing that things were previously different from how they are now. Thus, 
importantly, the temporal updating system operates with a model of the world that 
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concerns the world only ever as it is at present. Other times, and how things are at 
other times, are not represented in the model at all.   
 
We should stress that when we say that the model of the world used in temporal 
updating is a model that concerns the world only as it is at present, this is compatible 
with it being based on information the creature has gathered over time. It can 
therefore also include information about features of the world that are currently 
outside the creature’s sensory scope, but which the creature has learnt about – e.g., 
about features of locations it does not currently occupy, or about the existence of 
certain objects. There is even a sense in which this provides for a primitive way of 
representing goal states: The creature can think of certain items represented as 
existing in its environment as desirable, and of certain locations in that environment 
as good locations for doing certain things, and it can respond to these opportunities its 
environment might afford. This would allow it to act in ways that de facto prepare it 
for future encounters with those items or locations, even though other times are not 
represented in its model of the world as such.  
 
In order for the temporal updating system to work, the creature’s model of the world 
has to maintain information over time and also update as new information is received. 
This updating will result in changes to the creature’s world model; these include 
changes about, for example, what objects are at which locations, but also about what 
is or is not desirable or what the right thing to do is at certain places. Thus, some 
updating will happen as a result of changes that occur in the creature’s environment, 
independent of the creature itself, but some will happen because of changes in the 
creature’s motivational state (we discuss an example of the latter in section 2.3). 
8 
 
 
Certain parameters will govern these maintenance and updating processes, and we 
assume that these parameters will vary considerably in a context- or task-dependent 
way. For example, some types of information may be maintained for only very short 
periods of time and quickly be lost or updated, consistent with the idea of the contents 
of a working memory store changing dynamically, whereas others might be 
maintained for lengthy periods and be resistant to change. The types of mechanisms 
involved in making updates to the creature’s model of the world in response to 
changes purely extrinsic to the creature are also likely to be quite different from those 
involved when the changes are changes in the animals’ motivational state. What these 
mechanisms are, though, and what parameters govern their operations are empirical 
questions, and none of the arguments given below require making any particular 
assumptions about them, other than the basic assumption that information about 
objects and locations can be maintained even when they do not remain within sensory 
range.  
  
1.2 Temporal updating and behavior 
What follows is a description of some of the behaviors that we believe the temporal 
updating system can support. In each instance, we also specify what we take to be the 
related limitation, i.e., what a creature cannot do if it is operating only with a temporal 
updating system.  
 
(i) Single-trial learning. A creature capable only of temporal updating can 
acquire new information about the world from even a single learning episode 
and change its model of the world accordingly. This information can be of a 
variety of types, combined in various ways (e.g., information about the spatial 
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location and nature of an object), and it can be held in memory without the 
creature continuously making use of it (e.g., it might only do so at a later 
occasion after being cued). Limitation. Making use of information acquired in 
the past, even if it stems from just one learning episode, is separate from, and 
does not require, representing that information as stemming from the past, 
which is something a creature capable only of temporal updating cannot do.  
 
(ii) Elapsed-time sensitivity. A creature capable only of temporal updating can 
nevertheless be sensitive to how much time has elapsed since a certain event 
happened. Aspects of its model of the world might have a “shelf life”. That is, 
after incorporating a new piece of information of a certain type into its 
representation of the world (e.g., where some food is located), it might then 
only store that information for a certain amount of time and as a result its 
representation will change yet again at a later point in time. This could be 
governed systematically by an interval timer. Once a certain amount of time 
has elapsed on such a timer, the creature would no longer operate with a 
model of the world that includes the relevant piece of information (see section 
2.1 for more detail). Limitation. There is no sense in which the creature need 
be representing how long ago it obtained the relevant piece of information the 
representation of which is governed by a timer. This piece of information 
simply is or is not included in the creature’s model of the world as a function 
of how long ago it was obtained.   
 
(iii) Sequential learning. The type of sensitivity to elapsed time we have just 
characterized involves a process governing what happens to elements of a 
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creature’s model of the world over time, without temporal relations being 
represented within the model itself. Similar processes might also explain 
certain basic forms of sequential learning. A creature might become sensitive 
to the temporal order in which certain kinds of sequences unfold by acquiring 
a routine for updating its model of the world in that order, rather than that 
order being represented in the model itself. Limitation. A signature limit of 
the temporal updating system is that the correct functioning of the system 
depends on the creature receiving information about changes in its 
environment in the same order in which those changes happen; it will produce 
errors in situations in which these two orders come apart.      
 
(iv) Anticipation. We can distinguish between at least two ways in which such a 
creature might produce behaviors that serve to prepare for future states of 
affairs. First, the creature may possess some sort of temporal sensitivity 
whereby it behaves in a certain way when a phase timing system is in a certain 
state (e.g., turn up at a certain location at a certain time of the day), thus 
enabling it to behave in a way that yields future benefits. Second, as we said, 
such a creature may have a primitive way of representing goal states, by 
representing items existing in its environment as desirable, or locations in that 
environment as good locations to do certain things. This may cause it to act in 
ways that are optimal given certain possibilities its environment may afford 
(discussed further in section 2.2). Limitation. If they are not immediately 
accessible, the items represented as desirable (or the locations represented as 
good locations to do certain things) will de facto, at best, be encountered by 
the creature at some point in the future. However, the creature can represent 
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these items (and locations), and respond to their presence in its environment, 
without having the means to represent its potential encounters with them as 
events occurring at a separate, future point in time.  
 
1.3 Temporal reasoning 
The key difference between a creature capable only of temporal updating and one that 
is able to engage in what we call temporal reasoning is that the latter operates with a 
model of the world that includes a temporal dimension. That is to say, the model 
contains addresses for different points in time, and can therefore contain information 
not just concerning the world as it is at present, but also information about states of 
affairs different from those obtaining in the present, which obtained in the past or will 
obtain in the future. Here we summarize what we take to be the most fundamental 
kinds of representational resources this involves.  
 
(i) Representing particular times: A creature capable of temporal reasoning can 
represent events as happening at particular times, each of which only comes 
round once. Creatures not capable of temporal reasoning, by contrast, whilst 
capable of becoming sensitive to repeated temporal patterns in their 
environment (e.g., processes that display a circadian rhythm), will not 
distinguish between individual instantiations of these patterns as distinct 
unique occurrences (Campbell, 1996).  
 
(ii) Representing temporal order. Because a creature capable of temporal 
reasoning can represent the temporal order relations between events happening 
at different times, it can use information about this order to arrive at a correct 
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model of the world. It is not restricted to arriving at a correct model of the 
world only if it receives information about changes in its environment in the 
same order in which those changes occur. 
 
(iii) Tense. A creature engaging in temporal reasoning is also capable of using the 
system of particular times as a framework for orienting itself in, by using 
tense, i.e. locating events in the past, present or future. By contrast, the 
representations entertained by a creature capable only of temporal updating 
are tenseless, or untensed. Its model of the world concerns the world as it is at 
present not because items in it are represented as present, but simply because 
it is the model entertained at present.  
 
Having briefly outlined some of the key features of both the temporal updating system 
and of temporal reasoning, we will turn to considering ways in which the distinction 
between these two systems might be relevant to the interpretation of existing 
empirical research. Before doing so, we add two brief clarificatory comments. 
 
First, we assume the existence of particular timing mechanisms, which can explain 
how even a creature capable only of temporal updating might nevertheless display 
forms of behavior that are sensitive to elapsed time. Timing mechanisms of some sort 
are widely assumed to be available even to basic creatures (e.g., insects, Bradshaw & 
Holzapfel, 2010); we remain neutral on their nature (see Grondin, 2010). Clearly there 
are important further questions about the precise ways in which these mechanisms 
operate, and the limitations they are subject to. It is important to note, however, that 
our suggestion is not that there is one form of cognition – temporal updating – that 
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relies on the existence of mechanisms of this type, and another one – temporal 
reasoning – that does not. Mechanisms keeping track of time can obviously also be 
involved in contexts in which individuals make explicit judgements, e.g., about how 
long ago a certain event occurred (Friedman, 2001). The issue at stake concerns the 
function the relevant mechanisms play as part of the two systems: In one case, they 
simply govern the updating and maintenance of elements of the creature’s model of 
its present environment; in the other, they ground a representation of a temporal 
interval extending into the past (see section 2.1). 
 
Second, as we characterize it, the difference between temporal updating and temporal 
reasoning is fundamentally concerned with what a creature can represent – i.e. 
whether or not its model of the world contains a temporal dimension. In 
characterizing the distinction in this way, we have assumed that not all of the ways in 
which a creature might be sensitive to aspects of its environment involve that creature 
actually representing those aspects. That is, we are operating with a notion of 
representation that distinguishes representing an aspect of the world from simply 
being sensitive to it (see also Peacocke, 2017). This has to be distinguished from a 
broader notion of representation such as that involved when lower-level brain 
mechanisms are described as operating on ‘representations’ (for instance, one might 
describe the early visual system as ‘representing’ the differences between the two 
retinal images, but this is clearly not part of what is visually represented in the 
viewer’s perception). There has been considerable debate on how exactly to 
characterize the relevant difference between these different notions of representation 
(for some influential early discussions, see, e.g., Dennett, 1969; Stich, 1978). For 
present purposes, we want to emphasize that the distinction we are drawing between 
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merely being sensitive to temporal features of the world and representing time is not 
just a terminological one. If a creature can do the former but not the latter, this has 
concrete behavioural implications. For instance, as we have explained, the correct 
functioning of the temporal updating system is dependent on the creature receiving 
information about changes in its environment in the order in which these changes 
happen. This is a signature limit of the temporal updating system that the temporal 
reasoning system is not subject to (see section 3.1 for further discussion).  
 
2. Are animals capable of temporal reasoning? 
One type of debate that might be reframed by adopting the approach we are 
advocating is the debate about the existence of capacities for “mental time travel” 
(MTT) in non-human animals. Though this issue has received a great deal of attention 
(Roberts, 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Zentall, 2005), existing debates have 
reached something of an impasse, arguably because of the way in which some 
researchers have framed the basic dialectic. One strand of debate has considered 
whether MTT should be defined in information processing terms, or in terms of a 
particular kind of conscious awareness (Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003; 
Tulving, 2005). Yet, if the issue is entirely about possessing a type of conscious 
awareness, the question of whether animals are capable of MTT becomes empirically 
intractable. Similarly, researchers disputing the existence of MTT capacities in 
animals often appeal to the operation of low level associative mechanisms that might 
be sufficient to explain the relevant behavior in each case (e.g., Redshaw, Taylor, & 
Suddendorf, 2017; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010). Yet, whilst such alternative 
explanations might in principle be available in each case, dealing with individual 
findings in this sort of ad hoc way seems unconvincing.     
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We believe that the distinction that we are drawing, between temporal reasoning and 
temporal updating, provides a more helpful alternative to the dichotomies in play in 
these existing debates. Our distinction is one between two different systems of 
cognition, rather than one between cognition and mere low-level association. In 
describing animals as capable of temporal updating only, we assume that it 
nevertheless makes sense to talk about them as operating with a model of the world, 
and indeed a model that represents objects or places currently outside their sensory 
scope. We now discuss three empirical paradigms that have been used to make the 
case for MTT abilities in animals, and explain how animals might show the types of 
behavior in question even if they are restricted to mere temporal updating. We have 
chosen these paradigms because they are generally regarded as making the strongest 
empirical case for MTT capacities in animals. Some of them have been tested on 
more than one species, but only corvids have so far been shown to be successful in all 
three of them. We therefore concentrate on the relevant studies with corvids. Since 
our argument is that these studies are not able to establish whether animals are 
capable of temporal reasoning rather than just temporal updating, we will also 
consider later (section 3.3) what sort of alternative empirical paradigms, not yet tested 
on animals, would be able to establish this.   
 
2.1 “What-When-Where” Memory 
The most influential paradigm that has been taken to measure mental time travel to 
the past in animals is that of Clayton and Dickinson (1998). These researchers aimed 
to demonstrate that scrub jays can remember three key pieces of information about 
past events: what happened, where it happened, and when it happened. For present 
16 
 
 
purposes, it is the last of these pieces of information that is crucial. Representing that 
something happened at a particular point in the past is an instance of temporal 
reasoning. Thus we need to ask whether these studies provide good evidence that 
animals can do so.  
  
In the original study, what was taken as evidence that birds can remember “when” 
information is the fact that which cache site they return to is appropriately delay-
dependent. As shown in Figure 1, birds that learned that worms degraded over a 
period of 124 hours did not return to a cache of worms if given access to it after a 
124-hour delay, but instead returned to a cache of non-degrading peanuts. By contrast, 
if the delay was just 4 hours, birds returned to the cache of worms (their preferred 
foodstuff) rather than peanuts (see also Clayton, Yu, & Dickinson, 2003). To think 
that this study measures MTT is to think that the birds can remember the event of 
caching the worms, and how long ago this caching event occurred (Salwiczek, 
Watanabe, & Clayton, 2010). Our claim is that there is no need to make such an 
assumption in order to explain the birds’ behavior. It could be that the birds have 
some form of interval timing mechanism that governs how long the representation of 
edible worms remains a part of their model of the world (McCormack, 2001). Such a 
timer would begin to operate at the time of caching, and if the worms are then found 
to be rotten upon retrieval after a given interval (as in the learning phase of this 
study), the timer will subsequently ensure that a caching site is no longer represented 
as containing edible worms once that interval has elapsed (see Figure 1). In that way, 
we need not assume that the birds can remember the caching event itself; they simply 
do or do not continue to represent the hidden worms as a function of the state of their 
internal timer. Notably, this is quite different from assuming gradual forgetting of the 
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Figure 1. 
Illustration of test trials in Clayton and Dickinson’s (1998) study. In (a) 124-hour 
trials, scrub jays cached worms in Tray 1 and peanuts 120 hours later in Tray 2. After 
4 hours, they were allowed search in both trays. In (b) 4-hour trials, the birds initially 
cached peanuts in one tray and then cached worms in another tray after a 120 hour 
delay; 4 hours later they were allowed to search in both trays. Worms are the birds’ 
preferred food, but birds in the Degrade condition in the study received a series of 
pretraining trials in which they learnt that worms had degraded after a 124 hour 
period. These birds preferentially searched for peanuts in 124-hour trials and worms 
in 4-hour trials. The figure contrasts the type of representation assumed to underpin 
the birds’ preferences according to an MTT account with that which is assumed by 
the temporal updating account. On the former account, representations have tensed 
content that leads to birds to infer that the worms are not edible. On the latter account, 
it is assumed that whether the birds’ model of the world continues to include a 
representation of edible worms in Tray 1 is governed by an interval timer.  
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locations of cached foodstuffs, although one could potentially describe it as a form of 
interval-timer controlled forgetting. Characterized in this way, what is distinctive 
about this type of forgetting is that it is appropriately flexible to the interval in 
question. 
 
There are obviously further questions to be asked as to how exactly such an interval 
timing mechanism, which is triggered by the initial caching event, might function. 
Studies of interval timing in animals typically use considerably shorter intervals; 
indeed, Buhusi and Meck (2005) define interval timing as covering the range from 
under a second to 24 hours. However, there is no reason in principle to assume that 
animals do not have timing mechanisms that would allow them to be sensitive to the 
length of a 124 hour period (or even longer). Certainly, we are not committed to the 
idea that such a mechanism need be a dedicated internal clock; for example, a 
mechanism that keeps track of how many (fractions of) circadian cycles have passed 
would also be sufficient. Moreover, note that it is not just our account that needs to 
postulate the existence of such a mechanism that keeps track of time. Any account 
that holds that the birds actually remember the caching event and how long ago it 
occurred must also assume the existence of a mechanism that allows them to make an 
accurate judgment about the distance in the past at which that event occurred.  
 
Clayton et al. (2003) explicitly consider, and do not reject, the possibility that the 
scrub jays’ search behavior in their task could be governed by some interval timing 
mechanism, even in the case of somewhat more complex experimental designs. 
However, they do not seem to believe that this has a bearing on whether the task can 
be taken to measure MTT to the past. Our argument is that such a mechanism would 
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allow animals to show the appropriate level of temporal sensitivity in the absence of 
any capacity to represent past events, by facilitating temporal updating in a way that is 
delay-sensitive. The crucial point is that in order for the timing mechanism to fulfil its 
purpose, it is enough for it to govern what happens to elements of the animal’s model 
of its current environment; we need not postulate any ability to represent other times 
within this model (see also Hoerl, 2008). 
 
2.2 “Mental Time Travel to the Future” 
We now turn to considering whether a temporal updating account can also explain 
animal behavior in studies purporting to measure mental time travel to the future. 
Two types of tasks have been used in this area: tasks involving tool saving (inspired 
by Tulving’s, 2005, original “Spoon test”; Dufour & Sterck, 2008; Mulcahy & Call, 
2006; Osvath & Osvath, 2008), and tasks involving animals caching food that they do 
not currently desire eating (Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007; Cheke & Clayton, 
2012). We will consider each in turn.  
 
2.2.1 Tool saving tasks.  
A study by Kabadayi and Osvath (2017) can illustrate the general structure of the tool 
saving tasks: In this study, ravens first learnt that a certain tool – a stone – could open 
an apparatus containing a food reward (see Figure 2). The following day, they were 
re-introduced to the baited apparatus, but now the tool to open it was not available, 
and the apparatus was removed again after a while. One hour later, and at a different 
location, the ravens were offered a forced-choice selection between the functional tool 
and three non-functional distractors. Fifteen minutes after that, they were re-
introduced to the apparatus. Kabadayi and Osvath found that ravens selected the 
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functional tool on the first test trial of this kind, and that they did so also on the 
majority of further trials on which they had to make their selection 15 minutes before 
being given access to the apparatus.  
 
Does success in this tool saving task require MTT, and thus temporal reasoning, or 
can it be achieved using only the more basic temporal updating system? As we said 
before, an animal capable only of temporal updating maintains a model of the world 
only as it is at present. However, we allowed that this model could include items that 
the animal currently has no perceptual access to. Even if the ravens are capable only 
of temporal updating, the apparatus is still likely to figure in their model of the world 
when they are presented with the tool and the distractors, since they have learnt about 
its existence. Upon being re-introduced to the tool, the birds might thus realize that 
this gives them the opportunity potentially to open the apparatus, and this might be 
enough to motivate them to select the tool. That is to say, they select the tool because 
they want to open the apparatus, which they think of as part of their current 
environment. 
 
It is notable in this context that Kabadayi and Osvath seem to think that the ravens in 
their study must be engaged in MTT because they “plan for events outside of the 
current sensory scope” (p. 202). This seems to conflate two different issues. As 
indicated, we agree that the birds’ behavior takes account of an object not currently 
within their sensory scope. As it is not within their current sensory scope, it is also 
true they will therefore have access to that object only after a delay (if at all). 
Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that, in acting on the basis of their  
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(i) Raven learns that 
dropping stone into 
apparatus releases food.
(ii) One hour later, raven given opportunity to 
select one of four objects (the stone and three 
distractor non-functional objects). Apparatus 
not present. Raven tends to choose stone. 
(i) Following a delay of 15 mins, apparatus 
returned and raven given opportunity to use 
the stone selected previously to release food.
The apparatus will be 
returned in the future. If 
the stone is then available, 
it can be used to operate 
the apparatus. Choose the 
stone now and store for 
future use. 
The apparatus is 
somewhere in the 
environment. The stone 
operates the apparatus. 
Choose the stone.
MTT account Temporal updating account
(i) The next day, raven 
exposed to apparatus 
but no stone available. 
V
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Figure 2.  
Illustration of the tool-saving procedure in Kabadyi and Osvath’s (2017) study, in 
which ravens preferentially select a stone that can be used to operate an apparatus to 
release food. The figure contrasts the type of representation assumed to underpin the 
ravens’ performance according to an MTT account with that which is assumed by the 
temporal updating account. On an MTT account, birds infer the need for the tool by 
representing a future event in which they will re-encounter the apparatus. On a 
temporal updating account, the birds’ behavior is governed by a representation that 
includes information about objects outside of their current sensory scope (the 
apparatus) but does not include tensed content.  
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representation of this object and its properties, the ravens must also be representing 
their future encounter with that object as such, as happening at a separate point in 
time distinct from the present. It is true that the experiments in question de facto 
involve a delay between the time when the tool is selected and the time when it can be 
used. But it is far from obvious that this delay also plays any role in the reasoning that 
leads the birds to choose the tool. (It is interesting to note, in this context, that the 
birds chose the functional tool already on the first test trial, before they had any 
opportunity to learn about getting re-introduced to the apparatus a set delay after tool 
choice.) 
 
Part of what might motivate the idea that tool saving behavior demonstrates MTT 
capacities is that it seems to require some form of grasp of potential opportunities the 
environment might afford. But there is a more demanding and a less demanding way 
of understanding what the latter involves. In the context of discussing a similar study 
with apes, Osvath and Osvath (2008, p. 662) speak of “a capacity to construct mental 
experiences of potential events, something that could be expressed as a projection of 
the self into possible future events”. This is to read the requirement as a requirement 
for a capacity to represent modalities themselves – an ability on the part of the animal 
to represent the future time of being confronted with the apparatus as a point in time 
distinct from the present at which two possible states of affairs could obtain – the 
animal having the functional tool or its not having it – depending on what the animal 
does now. What we are arguing, in effect, is that success in tool saving tasks does not 
necessarily require a grasp of possibility in this sense (for a study suggesting that non-
human primates are in fact unable to represent such dual possibilities, see Redshaw & 
Suddendorf, 2016). It requires a grasp of possibility only in the more basic sense of 
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requiring a grasp of the apparatus as an object that is potentially accessible, even 
though it is not within the animal’s sensory scope. Such a grasp can be grounded in a 
representation simply of how the world actually is now (e.g., ‘there is a baited 
apparatus that can be opened with this tool’), albeit one that might leave some aspects 
of states of affairs in that world underdetermined. More specifically, it can be 
grounded in a representation of the form we take to be involved in the temporal 
updating system – a representation on which the object is represented as existing 
somewhere in the birds’ current spatial environment, and in this sense as potentially 
accessible. Together with the motivational state of desiring the contents of the 
apparatus, this seems sufficient to explain why the animals choose the tool.  
 
2.2.2 Caching tasks 
To illustrate the second type of task that has been taken as evidence of future mental 
time travel in animals, we will describe the study by Cheke and Clayton (2012). This 
study, depicted in Figure 3, relies on the fact that the birds show specific satiety 
effects, i.e., if they are sated on one food type, they prefer to eat a different food (note 
the specific set of foods used varied between birds; we illustrate one example set, and 
also only part of the overall study). This study started with a baseline caching trial in 
which birds were pre-fed with their maintenance diet that did not include peanuts or 
raisins, and then given the opportunity to cache each of the latter two food types 
freely in two trays. This was followed, after a delay, by a first retrieval stage in which 
they were pre-fed with raisins and subsequently given access to Tray 1 only. After a 
further delay there was a second retrieval stage in which they were pre-fed with 
peanuts and subsequently given access to Tray 2 only. In the test trials, which 
occurred some time after these retrieval stages, birds were pre-fed peanuts and then 
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allowed to again cache both raisins and peanuts freely in the two trays. Of interest 
was whether the birds would cache the two foodstuffs in a manner that corresponded 
to which food they would prefer to retrieve from which tray, given their specific 
satiety at retrieval from the relevant tray. Would they cache peanuts in Tray 1, 
because they will be sated on raisins when Tray 1 becomes available, and would they 
cache raisins in Tray 2, because they will be sated on peanuts when Tray 2 becomes 
available? In fact, 3 out of 4 birds showed this pattern.  
  
Cheke and Clayton’s (2012) discussion frames this finding in terms of the idea that 
animals can “act for a future need that is different from their current one” (p. 171), or 
“overcome their current desire to anticipate […] future needs” (ibid.), implying that it 
demonstrates MTT capacities. As we will argue, though, this is a somewhat 
misleading characterization, and an explanation of the birds’ behaviour purely in 
terms of temporal updating is readily available. According to this alternative 
explanation, birds will, under normal circumstances, represent both caching trays as 
equally good locations for caching food. This is what happens in the baseline caching 
trials, in which they cache foods in equal amounts in both trays. The birds are then 
given the opportunity, in the two retrieval stages, to retrieve food from Tray 1 only 
when pre-fed raisins and from Tray 2 only when pre-fed peanuts. In response to this, 
we suggest, they update their model of the world, such that now Tray 1 is represented 
as a good location for peanuts but not raisins, whereas Tray 2 is represented as a good 
location for raisins but not peanuts. This change in their model of the world explains 
why subsequently they differentially cache each foodstuff in a different location. 
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Baseline caching
First 
retrieval 
stage
Tray 1 Tray 2(ii) Peanuts and 
raisins available to 
cache in either tray
(i) Prefed
raisins
(i) Prefed
peanuts
(ii) Allowed to retrieve from Tray 1, 
raisins not desired due to prefeeding
(ii) Allowed to retrieve from 
Tray 2, peanuts not desired due 
to prefeeding
Test trial
(i) Prefed peanuts before caching
Tray 1 Tray 2(ii) Peanuts and 
raisins available to 
cache in either tray
v
Tray 1 a good place to 
cache peanuts and Tray 
2 a good place to cache 
raisins.
MTT account Temporal updating account
(i) Prefed neither 
peanuts nor raisins 
before caching
Peanuts not desired now but 
when Tray 1 becomes 
available they, unlike raisins, 
will be desirable, therefore 
cache them in Tray 1.
Second 
retrieval 
stage
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Figure 3.  
Illustration of the procedure in Cheke and Clayton’s (2012) study for one pair of food 
types (peanuts and raisins). Boxes represent trays made available as caching 
locations; discs represent containers with food – black for peanuts, white for raisins. 
In the initial phase of the study (left-hand side of the figure), the birds were allowed to 
freely cache peanuts and raisins in two trays. In this initial phase, birds had not been 
pre-fed either food type. After a delay, they were pre-fed raisins and then allowed to 
retrieve from Tray 1. The pre-feeding of raisins meant that they no longer desired the 
raisins in the tray, preferring the peanuts. After a second delay, they were pre-fed 
peanuts and allowed to retrieve from Tray 2. The pre-feeding of peanuts meant that 
they no longer desired the peanuts in the tray, preferring the raisins. In the subsequent 
test trial (right-hand side of the figure), the birds were first pre-fed peanuts and were 
then again allowed to freely cache raisins and peanuts in both trays. The birds now 
preferred to cache peanuts in Tray 1 and raisins in Tray 2. On a mental time travel 
account, the birds infer that they should cache peanuts in Tray 1 on the basis of a 
representation of a future event in which they will find peanuts but not raisins 
desirable. On a temporal updating account, it is assumed that the birds update their 
model of the world, learning during the two retrieval stages that Tray 1 is a good 
place to cache peanuts and Tray 2 is a good place to cache raisins.  
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One might object to this explanation that it leaves out the significance of the fact that 
the birds are pre-fed peanuts at the start of the test-trial, and are thus, when 
subsequently allowed to cache, already sated on this food. Despite this satiation, they 
nevertheless cache peanuts in Tray 1. This seems to be what is behind Cheke and 
Clayton’s claims about the birds overcoming their current desires in favour of future 
ones, which suggest something like the following argument: The birds are currently 
sated on peanuts. Yet, they cache peanuts in the tray that will become available after 
they have been pre-fed raisins. Thus, they must be able to realize that, at that future 
time, they will desire to eat peanuts, and this is what motivates them to cache peanuts 
in that tray, even though they do not desire eating peanuts at present (see Figure 3). 
As characterized, this argument rests on the assumption that an animal restricted to 
thinking only about how things are at present is thereby also restricted to acting only 
based on its present appetitive desires. Note that in the case of food-caching birds in 
particular, there is no reason for making such an assumption. As Cheke and Clayton 
(2012) themselves note, there is separate evidence that the motivational systems for 
eating and caching operate semi-independently from one another. Furthermore, they 
also describe a separate experiment, consisting only of the equivalent of the test trial 
in the study described above, which shows that, whilst specific satiety reduces the 
motivation to cache the pre-fed food type, it does not eliminate it.  
 
Thus, in so far as Cheke and Clayton’s study can be described as one in which the 
birds ‘overcome’ a current desire in favour of one that will serve their future needs, 
the issue at stake cannot be that the motivation to cache the pre-fed food clashes with 
a current lack of motivation to eat that food brought about by specific satiety. Rather, 
the only sense in which the birds can be said to ‘overcome’ an existing motivation is 
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that, by default, if pre-fed one food type, they have a motivation to cache less of that 
food-type, and this changes into a motivation to selectively cache the pre-fed food-
type in a particular tray once they can learn that that food-type is desirable at retrieval 
from the relevant tray (see also Cheke & Clayton, 2012, p. 174). This is entirely 
compatible with an account on which the relevant retrieval trials simply cause the bird 
to update its representation of which tray is a good location for caching which food. 
 
2.3 Past and future thinking and animals: concluding remarks 
Comparison across Figures 1-3 should make one aspect of our account clear. In each 
instance, the representation that we are assuming underpins the birds’ behavior must 
necessarily also be part of what is represented according to an MTT account (i.e., that 
Tray 1 does not contain edible worms, that the stone should be chosen because it 
operates the apparatus, that Tray 1 is a good place to cache peanuts). Because of this, 
the representations we are positing cannot be considered to be implausibly ad hoc. 
Other questions one might raise with respect to our account, too, arise in the same 
way for accounts that postulate MTT abilities in animals. Thus, we have already noted 
that an MTT based interpretation of Clayton and Dickinson’s (1998) study also has to 
assume the existence of some sort of mechanism that keeps track of time, which 
underpins animals’ putative ability to remember “when” information. Similarly, in 
connection with our interpretation of Kabadayi and Osvath’s (2017) study, questions 
might be asked about the conditions under which animals continue to represent an 
object as part of their current environment, even if it is outside their sensory range, 
and the conditions under which they stop doing so. Identifying these conditions is an 
empirical matter, and it is highly likely that the conditions vary by context and across 
species. But note that an explanation of the birds’ behaviour that ascribes to them an 
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ability to imagine future events raises exactly parallel questions as to the conditions 
under which the animal does or does not assume the future event will occur.    
 
The key point that the plausibility of our account hinges on is whether we are correct 
about the general means by which the birds arrive at the representations that underpin 
their behaviour, i.e., purely as a result of the operation of the temporal updating 
system. And, as should be clear, there are real constraints on what is available to such 
a system: only a model concerning the world as it is at present is maintained, tensed 
content is absent from that model, and the correct functioning of the system depends 
on information about changes in the environment being received in the same order in 
which those changes happen. These constraints mean that, in explaining animal 
behavior, our account only allows for a distinctively narrow set of options. The 
alternative MTT account assumes that the birds arrive at these (very same) 
representations necessary to guide behavior as a result of first remembering a past or 
imagining a future event. Note, though, (and this is not always made clear) that MTT 
alone does not deliver these representations: e.g., in order to guide behavior, 
remembering the event of caching worms has to be combined with other information 
about how long it takes worms to degrade and how much time has actually elapsed, 
and then an inference has to be reached about the contents of Tray 1. Thus, the 
plausibility of that account hinges not only on whether animals can be thought to 
engage in MTT, but on whether they can be thought to use the information it delivers 
alongside any other information that is required to yield a conclusion as to what needs 
to be done right now.   
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Before leaving the issue of animal cognition, we want to briefly consider two recent 
theoretical accounts that have also attempted to provide an alternative explanation of 
animals’ performance on these sorts of tasks. Redshaw (2014) has argued that animals 
may have “uncontextualized” representations of events, by which he means 
representations that fail to locate these events in any specific temporal context (in his 
view, such contextualizing would require metarepresentational abilities). And in 
articulating his own dual systems theory, Keven (2016) has argued that animals (and 
young children) do not possess episodic memory but may possess event memories 
that are “perceptually-based [and] snapshot-like”. Unlike episodic memories, he 
believes these event memories are not organized into narratives with temporal-causal 
structure. Both accounts thus share the idea that animals have some type of free-
floating representations of past (or future) events. Furthermore, although the two 
authors do not make this explicit in their discussions, their accounts are both 
compatible with one idea we are pressing, namely that there is no reason to believe 
that animals are capable of thinking about particular, unique, times. Nevertheless, the 
account we have put forward differs fundamentally from their accounts. The temporal 
updating system simply maintains a model of the world that records information 
about the environment and is updated in response to new information. Situations that 
obtained or will obtain at other times do not feature in such a model, even in an 
uncontextualized way. One way to put this is to say that on Redshaw and Keven’s 
accounts, animals are not truly cognitively stuck in time: they can mentally meander 
through time even if they have no idea where in time their meandering takes them. On 
our account, by contrast, animals really are cognitively stuck in time: they cannot 
think about other times at all. 
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Yet, whilst our account is thus more radical than those offered by Redshaw and 
Keven, it can actually be seen to construe animals’ behavior as more purposive than 
their accounts do. Note that, precisely because of their supposedly uncontextualized 
nature, it is ultimately not clear how exactly event memories of the type envisaged by 
Redshaw and Keven are supposed to explain the types of animal behaviors we have 
described – a point Redshaw himself seems to acknowledge in the context of 
discussing tool saving behaviors in animals, which he characterizes simply as cases in 
which an uncontextualized representation of using the tool in question induces a bias 
to select it again. That is, it is not clear how uncontextualized representations of how 
things were or will be at unspecified other times can systematically and appropriately 
guide present action (e.g., how can they generate the types of representations 
described at the beginning of this section, such as “Tray 1 does not contain edible 
worms”?). By contrast, even though on our account animals are not capable of 
representing situations obtaining at other times at all, the model of the current world 
they operate with can clearly give them good reasons to act in certain ways. For 
instance, we assumed that the ravens in Kabadayi and Osvath’s study choose the 
functional tool because it allows them to open the apparatus containing the food 
reward, which they represent as an item existing in their environment. 
 
3. When do children acquire temporal reasoning abilities? 
We have argued that there are good reasons to doubt whether animals can think about 
the past or the future, and therefore that they have anything more than the temporal 
updating system. We believe that the same is true of infants, although unsurprisingly 
due to their limited motor skills the paradigms used to look at memory (e.g., Barr, 
Dowden & Hayne, 1996; Rovee-Collier, 1999) and future planning (e.g., McCarty, 
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Clifton, & Collard, 1999) are typically quite different from those described above that 
have been used with animals (though see Atance, Louw, & Clayton, 2015; Martin 
Ordas, Atance, & Caza, 2017; Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010; Russell, Cheke, 
Clayton, & Meltzoff, 2011). The challenge that our distinction provides for 
developmental psychologists is a more substantial one, though, than simply making 
the case that infants are capable only of temporal updating: it is to characterize the 
subsequent developmental emergence of the temporal reasoning system. In this 
section, we highlight some of the limitations in young children’s temporal cognition 
and also some of the key developmental achievements that are required for mature 
temporal thought, focusing on two related areas: (i) the shift from relying on temporal 
updating to being able to reason about temporal order and (ii) the emergence of 
thought about other times. To anticipate, although we believe that infants operate only 
with the temporal updating system, and that temporal reasoning does not emerge until 
around 4-5 years, we think 2 to 3-year-olds may be at an intermediate developmental 
stage in which they are beginning to represent non-present situations and discriminate 
between them in a way that correlates with the difference between past and future 
situations. However, this is not genuine temporal reasoning, and children of this age 
may fall back on the temporal updating system.  
 
3.1 Temporal updating versus reasoning about temporal order 
Even infants can be sensitive to and learn about event order. Numerous studies of 
deferred imitation in infants have conclusively established that, at least by the second 
year of life, they can observe a short sequence of actions and reproduce those actions 
in the correct order even after a delay (e.g., Bauer & Mandler, 1989; Bauer, Wenner, 
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Dropik, & Wewerka, 2000). Preschool children also rapidly acquire a repertoire of 
what have been described as ‘scripts’ for routines (Nelson, 1996).  
 
These studies of infants and pre-schoolers suggest that children are very good at 
remembering and reproducing actions in the correct order. This basic ability in itself, 
however, is something that can fall within the scope of the temporal updating system 
rather than the temporal reasoning system. A key limitation of the temporal updating 
system that might be used to show whether children do indeed rely on it in learning 
about sequences is that the correct functioning of the system depends on it receiving 
information about events in the same order in which those events occur. We have 
described this as a signature limit of temporal updating, which contrasts sharply with 
a much more sophisticated way in which adult humans can deal with change over 
time, by engaging in genuine temporal reasoning about what happens when.  
 
Although relatively few studies have examined temporal reasoning skills in young 
children, the evidence suggests that they struggle in situations in which the order in 
which they find out about successive changes may not reflect the order in which they 
happen – that is, in situations in which they cannot rely purely on temporal updating. 
In one study carried out by McCormack and Hoerl (2005), children learned that 
pressing (e.g.) a red button caused a marble to be released into a window of a box, 
and that pressing a blue button caused a toy car to be released. There was only ever 
one object in the window of the box at a time, so if the red button was pressed to yield 
a marble, on pressing the blue button the marble dropped away and was replaced by a 
car. Children also learned about two dolls who always acted in a particular order. The 
window of the box was then covered over, and two types of tasks were carried out. In 
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one version of the task, children watched as one doll pressed the red button and then 
the other doll pressed the blue button. Under this condition, when asked which object 
was in the window of the box, even three-year-olds were able to answer correctly. 
This task can be solved by temporal updating: children can sequentially update their 
model of what is in the box window: initially representing it empty, then as containing 
a marble, and then as containing a car. However, in another version of the task the 
dolls pressed their buttons behind a screen, out of sight of children, and the dolls were 
then left beside the buttons they had pressed. Temporal updating could not be used to 
pass this version of the task, which required that children infer the window’s contents 
by reasoning about the order in which the dolls had pressed their buttons, and even 4-
year-olds struggled to do this (see also McCormack & Hoerl, 2007). Similar results 
were found in an earlier study by Povinelli, Landry, Theall, Clark, and Castille 
(1999), which used video clips to decouple the order in which children found out 
about two events from the order in which they actually happened.  
 
Other studies have indicated that children of this age also have difficulties 
appropriately reasoning about temporal order relations in planning tasks, such as in 
circumstances in which they have to think ahead about the order in which events are 
going to unfold in the future (Lohse, Kalitschke, Ruthmann, & Rakoczy, 2015; 
McColgan & McCormack, 2008; relatedly see also Kaller, Rahm, Spreer, Mader, & 
Unterrainer, 2008; Tecwyn, Thorpe, & Chappell, 2014). Martin-Ordas (2017) asked 
children to select one of three objects to bring back to two rooms they had visited 
earlier; the correct answer was to choose the key needed to open a marble box 
containing marbles to use on a marble run. Three and four-year-olds correctly selected 
the key, but they were unable to judge which room they should then visit first – the 
37 
 
 
room with the marble box or the marble run room. It was not until children were five 
that they could reason appropriately about the order in which these future visits 
needed to happen.   
 
The claim that children below around 5 years find it difficult to reason about before-
and-after relations in time might sound surprising given that children actually acquire 
the verbal terms “before” and “after” at an earlier age (Busby-Grant & Suddendorf, 
2011). There is, though, also evidence regarding children’s competence in using and 
interpreting those terms that is in line with what our account would predict. 
Specifically, they have difficulty correctly interpreting these terms when the order in 
which events are mentioned in a sentence does not match their order in the world 
(e.g., “Anna took off her coat after she took off her hat.”; Blything & Cain, 2016; 
Blything, Davies, & Cain, 2015), suggesting they use an order-of-mention strategy to 
interpret them. While there are a variety of interpretations of this finding (Blything et 
al., 2015; Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, 2012), one possibility is that this reflects pre-
schoolers’ difficulties with temporal reasoning and their tendency to use the temporal 
updating system.   
 
Taken together, the findings we have discussed here suggest that while even infants 
can learn about and be sensitive to event order, difficulties in reasoning about 
temporal order persist into the preschool years, with the findings from some studies 
suggesting that the errors children make may be due to falling back on the temporal 
updating system. By the time children are five, existing evidence suggests that they 
have consolidated some important new temporal reasoning skills.   
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3.2 Thinking about other times 
As with animals, there is considerable debate over how infants’ and preschoolers’ 
memory abilities should be characterized (e.g., Bauer, 2007; Fivush, 2011; Howe & 
Courage, 1997). There have been attempts with various degrees of success to use a 
supposed “what-when-where” paradigm analogous to that used with animals (Burns 
Russell, & Russell, 2015; Martin-Ordas et al., 2017; Russell et al., 2011). Notably, 
even relatively old children struggle with tasks analogous to that of Clayton and 
Dickinson (1998) that require sensitivity to how long ago an item was hidden, which 
on our account of animal performance on such tasks is unsurprising because children 
would have no need in everyday life to have their search behavior governed by 
sensitive interval timing mechanisms. Performance on the tasks more typically used 
to measure infant memory (Bauer et al., 2000; Rovee-Collier, 1999) can be 
straightforwardly accounted for in terms of the temporal updating system. However, it 
is less straightforward to explain pre-schoolers’ verbal descriptions of non-current 
events merely in terms of the idea of temporal updating. Existing studies suggest that 
children who are 2-3 years can talk about both past and future events, albeit often 
providing limited and fragmented information (Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, 
& Tustin, 2011; Peterson, 2002; Weist & Zevenbergen, 2008). It is widely accepted 
that children of this age can refer to things that are outside their current sensory scope 
(Sachs, 1983), which is something that the temporal updating system could handle if 
these things are still part of their model of the world as it is now. However, children 
do not just refer to things outside their current sensory scope, they often use tense to 
describe non-current events, and we have assumed that the temporal updating system 
does not operate with tensed representations. Given that 2-3-year-olds can refer to 
events in the distant past and in the future, and 3-year-olds also use temporal adverbs 
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(Weist & Buczowska 1987; Weist & Zevenbergen, 2008), it might seem paradoxical 
to argue that they cannot think about the past or future. 
  
We accept that children of this age do not rely only on the basic temporal updating 
system. However, we want to argue that they are at an intermediate stage at which 
they nevertheless do not yet possess genuine temporal reasoning abilities, and, in that 
sense, do not have proper concepts of the past or future. To make this argument it is 
necessary to consider more carefully the nature of the domain over which the 
temporal reasoning system operates. Temporal reasoning operates over the domain of 
times, with times arranged in a linear array such that each time occupies a unique 
unrepeated location in the array. Reasoning about such a domain involves a grasp of 
two distinctive types of systematicity that obtain within it. First, systematic before-
and-after relations obtain between points in that array due to its linearity – e.g., for a 
sequence of times A, B, and C, if A happens before B and B happens before C, A 
must also happen before C. Second, which times are in the past, present, and future 
changes systematically with the progression of time: for the sequence of times just 
mentioned, if A is now present, then both B and C are in the future. But when B will 
be present, A will be past and C future, and when C will be present, both A and B will 
be past. 
  
There is no reason to believe that young pre-schoolers can reason about the domain of 
time in this way. While they may talk about events that are in the past or the future, 
there is no reason to believe that they have a sense of where in the past or future those 
events are located or a grasp of the systematic temporal relations that obtain between 
these events. In Tillman, Marghetis, Barner, and Srinivasan’s (2017) recent study, 3-
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year-olds were unable to make judgments about the relative order of a set of past and 
future events (their previous and next birthdays, breakfast this morning, and dinner 
this evening). Indeed, 3-year-olds in this study were unable to reliably judge the 
deictic status of these events (nor the deictic meaning of time words such as 
“yesterday”). Similarly, Busby-Grant and Suddendorf (2009) found that children of 
this age could not discriminate the relative distances in the future of even very 
widely-separated events (for instance, going home from day-care versus next 
Christmas).  
  
Important improvements in children’s ability to think about the temporal locations of 
events occur between 3 and 5 years. There is evidence that by the time children are 
four they can begin to make some discriminations about the relative recency of 
unrelated events in the past (Friedman, 1991; Friedman, Gardner, & Zubin, 1995; 
Friedman & Kemp, 1998; McCormack & Hanley, 2011; though see Pathman, 
Larkina, Burch, & Bauer, 2013). However, even four-year-olds struggle to order the 
times of events in the future (Friedman, 2000; McCormack & Hanley, 2011), or to 
judge the remoteness of past and future events (Busby-Grant & Suddendorf, 2009; 
Tillman et al., 2017). Moreover, a number of studies have shown that they tend to 
confuse near past and near future times (Friedman, 2003; Friedman & Kemp, 1998). 
Indeed, the ability to order events in time continues to improve substantially over the 
next few years (Hudson & Mayhew, 2011; Pathman et al., 2013; Tillman et al., 2017). 
  
We have suggested that reasoning over the domain of times involves not just 
understanding the relations that obtain between points in time but also understanding 
that which points in time are in the past, present, or future changes systematically 
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with the progression of time. Extremely few studies have addressed children’s ability 
to engage in the kind of temporal perspective-taking that grasping this requires, but 
those that have indicate that children below 4 do not have this ability (Cromer, 1971; 
Harner, 1980, 1982). In Cromer’s task, children had to consider the deictic status of 
an event from a point in time that was not the present. For example, children were 
told a story about a girl who visited a farm where a number of things happened, 
including her seeing birds, and who then returned from the farm. Children had to 
judge (e.g.) at what stage in the story the girl could refer to seeing the birds in the past 
tense. It was not until children were 4-5 years that they were able to answer these 
types of questions correctly.  
  
Put together with the findings discussed in the last sub-section, the evidence weighs 
heavily in favor of the idea of an important transition in the period from 3-5 years in 
children’s ability to engage in temporal reasoning. During this period, children 
acquire mature concepts of time and start to be able to reason about the domain of 
linearly-ordered times. This leaves the question, though, of how we want to 
characterize temporal cognition in the early preschool years, if we want to argue that 
children of this age cannot properly think about the past and future. We suggest that at 
this age children are able to make some sort of discrimination between situations that 
have obtained and situations that are yet to come. One way to put this is to say that 
they may retain models of the world that have been superseded (i.e., of past states of 
affairs), or models of the world as it has yet to be (i.e., of future states of affairs). As 
demonstrated by generally accurate use of past and future tense, they can usually 
appropriately discriminate between these models, according to which of these two 
types they belong to. Nevertheless, we do not believe that children of this age are 
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treating some models as descriptions of situations located at specific past times and 
others as descriptions of situations located at specific future times. Rather, we believe 
that children of this age may simply make a categorical distinction that marks a 
difference between these two types of situations; specifically, we believe that children 
discriminate between situations that are no longer alterable and situations that are still 
potentially alterable (see McCormack, 2015; McCormack & Hoerl, 2017, for 
considerably more detail on this proposal and our developmental model). However, 
this is different from having one unified model of the world within which time itself is 
represented. Having such a unified model goes beyond just representing certain sets 
of states of affairs and being able to discriminate between them. It involves 
representing time as one of the dimensions along which reality is extended, and as a 
linear dimension along which these sets of states of affairs can therefore be organized, 
so that they can all be captured in one set of systematic temporal relations in which 
they stand to each other. Temporal reasoning, in other words, operates with a four-
dimensional picture of reality, on which everything that happens can be described by 
giving its location and the time at which it happens. It is the discovery of time as this 
fourth dimension that is the crucial step in the transition to a temporal reasoning 
system.  
 
Space precludes us from commenting more than very briefly here on further 
developmental questions regarding cognitive prerequisites for the development of 
temporal reasoning – in particular regarding claims that have been made to the effect 
that temporal reasoning requires language (Bennett, 1964), or that it requires a 
capacity for metarepresentation (Redshaw, 2014). With regard to the role of language, 
we believe it is plausible (although we will not develop the argument here) that 
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acquisition of the basic temporal concepts discussed here requires language, perhaps 
because it is only through discussing non-current events with others that children 
begin to grasp how such events are temporally organized (Hoerl & McCormack, 
2005; Welch-Ross, 2001). This does not mean, though, that children learning different 
languages or growing up in different cultures acquire different concepts of time. We 
assume that our description of the temporal updating system captures basic and 
universal features of human thinking about time, and this includes a notion of time as 
linear. Although cultures may differ in the extent to which they emphasize cyclical or 
repeating patterns in time, we follow Gell (1992) in assuming that linearity is a 
universally basic feature (McCormack, 2015, McCormack & Hoerl, 2017). The 
features of the temporal reasoning system that we have highlighted will of course be 
overlaid by further culturally specific constructs, such as different ways of 
metaphorically mapping time onto space or of measuring time using a calendar 
system. These further culturally-specific aspects of development have a protracted 
developmental time course (Friedman, 2003; McCormack, 2015).  
 
With regard to the issue of metarepresentation, we note an interesting structural 
parallel between the account we have proposed of the development of temporal 
reasoning capacities and Perner’s (1991) influential account of the development of 
metarepresentation. On Perner’s account, children move from having only one model 
of the world through an intermediate phase of being able to switch between different 
such models, before finally being able to conceive of them as different representations 
of the same reality. On our account of the emergence of temporal reasoning, children 
are initially capable only of temporal updating, and thus operate with a tenseless 
model of the world. They then begin to be able to maintain models describing non-
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current states of the world but they do not represent these as states organised along a 
single temporal dimension, and thus do not grasp the systematic temporal relations 
between them. In acquiring genuine temporal reasoning, a unified model emerges that 
allows children to represent how these states are temporally organized and 
interrelated.  
 
Although the structural parallel is interesting, we note, however, that there is an 
important difference between Perner’s description of the emergence of 
metarepresentation and our description of the emergence of temporal reasoning, in 
that the accounts differ in terms of the type of systematic relations between models 
that children need to learn to grasp. His claim is that children need to grasp how 
different models of the world are related to the actual world – specifically, that they 
are representations of reality – and it is through this that children understand how the 
models relate to each other, as different possible ways of representing the very same 
world. That is, grasping the type of systematic relations that Perner is interested in is a 
consequence of understanding the representational nature of mental states. In our 
account, children must grasp the systematic temporal relations between different 
models of non-current states of the world by realizing they are located at points on the 
same time line. It cannot be straightforwardly assumed that grasping this type of 
relation necessarily requires grasping the representational nature of mental states, 
although we recognize that there is a more detailed developmental story to be told 
about how this new ability comes about, further discussion of which we provide 
elsewhere (Hoerl & McCormack, 2005; McCormack, 2015; McCormack & Hoerl, 
1999, 2001, 2017). 
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3.3 Animal cognition revisited: lessons from developmental studies? 
Before turning to adult human cognition, we want to briefly consider whether the 
findings of developmental studies might help illuminate what types of animal research 
would be capable of providing a test of the hypothesis that animals rely only on the 
temporal updating system. Developmental studies have looked in detail at children’s 
ability to represent and reason about event order information, and two types of 
findings are of note. First, developmentalists have devised studies that provide 
children with information about changes that have happened in a sequence, but do not 
provide this information in the order in which the changes themselves unfolded (both 
by showing mis-ordered videoclips that children need to mentally re-order, Povinelli 
et al., 1999, and by requiring children to infer the sequence from two pieces of 
information that are presented simultaneously, McCormack & Hoerl, 2005, 2007). 
The temporal updating system as we have described it can only provide an accurate 
model of how the world is now if changes are encountered in the sequence in which 
they actually occur, so reliance on that system would result in task failure. Second, we 
also note that some developmental planning tasks require that children do more than 
simply select a tool that is functional for obtaining a reward that exists somewhere in 
their current environment. In McColgan and McCormack’s (2008) study, children 
must bear in mind the order in which events are going to unfold in the future and 
appropriately place an object so that it will be encountered later at the right point in a 
sequence of future events; in the study of Martin-Ordas (2017), children must think 
ahead about the order in which they need to visit two rooms so that they are 
appropriately prepared when they later encounter the reward apparatus. We anticipate 
that it might be possible to devise animal versions of both these types of studies, and 
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such studies would prove particularly illuminating in testing our hypothesis about 
limitations in animal cognition.  
 
4. Dual systems in adult human temporal cognition 
Once the capacity for temporal reasoning has developed, does the temporal reasoning 
system simply replace the more primitive temporal updating system, or does the 
temporal updating system remain in operation even in adults? In this section, we 
consider some evidence – albeit from a somewhat unusual source – suggesting that 
even adults still operate with the temporal updating system alongside engaging in 
temporal reasoning.  
 
A claim familiar from some of the existing literature on dual systems perspectives on 
cognition is that one of the hallmarks of two systems being at work alongside each 
other in people’s thinking about a particular domain is that they can give rise to cases 
of what Sloman (1996, p. 12) calls “simultaneous contradictory beliefs” about aspects 
of that domain, where ‘belief’ is to be understood as “a propensity, a feeling or 
conviction that a response is appropriate even if it is not strong enough to be acted 
on” (ibid.). The idea is that in a case in which the two systems yield diverging 
outputs, the more primitive, automatic, system still delivers its verdict, even if it is not 
endorsed by the more deliberate reasoning system, giving rise to a felt pull towards 
making one judgment, despite this judgment being rejected as incorrect.  
  
We believe that a careful consideration of aspects of what might be called adults’ 
‘naïve theory of time’ provides evidence for the existence of such simultaneous 
contradictory beliefs also in the domain of temporal cognition. Unlike naïve theories 
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of some other domains (Gelman, 2006), the nature of this naïve theory of time still 
awaits systematic empirical attention, although there is growing interest in this topic 
amongst philosophers (see, e.g., Braddon-Mitchell & Miller, 2017; Callender, 2017). 
Their interest stems from their belief that there are particular elements of people’s 
naïve theory of time that cannot simply be explained in terms of the physics of time. 
i.e. as reflecting features of time as it figures in physical theory. This raises the 
question as to how exactly these elements of people’s naïve theory of time should be 
characterized and what their actual psychological sources are. Using the term 
‘manifest time’ to refer to humans’ naïve theory of time, Callender (2017, pp. 23f.) 
puts the point as follows: “[Once] one removes the project of explaining manifest 
time [in terms of physical reality, one] places it on the desks of psychologists. The 
psychologists, however, don’t know it’s on their desk. The end result is that manifest 
time remains unexplained.” 
 
One core ingredient of humans’ naïve theory of time that has been argued to require 
such a psychological explanation is the belief that there is an objective flow or 
passage of time for which there is no spatial equivalent. This belief appears to be 
universal (Gell, 1992), despite cultural variations in a number of other aspects in 
which time is conceptualized (Boroditsky, 2011). It has also been documented in the 
context of research in psycholinguistics on limitations on the extent to which aspects 
of time can be captured by spatial metaphors. There it has been argued that, whilst 
spatial metaphors for time are ubiquitous, there is also a set of metaphors for time that 
take change or motion as their source, pointing to a unique attribute of ‘transience’ 
involved in the concept of time, which cannot be captured other than in terms of 
notions that themselves invoke time (Galton, 2011).   
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What exactly is involved in thinking of time as flowing or passing? Philosophers have 
offered an analysis of this ingredient of people’s naïve theory of time on which it 
involves the combination of two components: the belief that there is just one 
objectively present moment in time, and the belief that which moment in time is 
objectively present changes over time (Leininger, 2015). The claim that people’s 
naïve theory of time involves the belief that there is one objectively present moment 
in time is best illustrated by contrasting what people take to determine “now” with 
what they take to determine “here”. What counts as “here” is clearly just a matter of 
where the speaker using that word is located, and thus a place is “here” only for the 
speaker who is using the word. A particular place’s being “here” is not a property of 
space itself; it is purely a matter of perspective. By contrast, people’s naïve theory of 
time does not conceive of a particular time being “now” as similarly being purely a 
matter of perspective: rather, which moment in time is present is taken to be a 
property of time itself (and hence the same for everyone), and moreover a property of 
time that itself changes over time. It is in this sense that the naïve theory of time 
involves the belief that there is one objectively present moment in time. Moreover, 
there is a crucial connection between the belief that there is one objectively present 
moment of time – one objective now – and the belief that there is such a thing as the 
passage or flow of time. The idea of the flow or passage of time requires that there is 
an objective now because it assumes that there is something about time itself that 
changes over time – i.e., there is a property that time itself has that is different from 
one moment to another, namely which moment of time is present. Time is assumed to 
be fundamentally unlike space in this respect, because space does not possess such a 
property – where “here” is does not change because space itself changes, but only  
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because the location of the speaker using the word changes. By contrast, the idea that 
time flows or passes assumes that which moment in time is “now” is an objective 
matter, a property possessed by time itself. By the same token, though, it also requires 
that which moment in time is thus objectively present is something that does change 
over time. As time goes on, the objective now occupies successively later points in 
time. It is this change that time itself is assumed to undergo over time that the passage 
or flow of time consists in. 
 
As we mentioned, much recent debate in the philosophy of time has focused on 
whether components of the naïve theory of time such as the idea that time passes or 
flows reflect how time really is, particularly in the light of contemporary physics. We 
are not directly concerned with this debate here (see Rovelli, 2018, for an accessible 
discussion). Rather, we want to consider the idea of the passage or flow of time in the 
light of our dual systems theory of temporal cognition. In what follows, we wish to 
defend two claims: (i) There is an inherent contradiction in people’s naïve theory of 
time, in so far as it contains within it both the belief that there is an objective present 
and also the belief that which moment in time is objectively present changes. (ii) This 
contradiction in people’s naïve theory of time can be explained in terms of the co-
existence of the dual systems we have identified.     
  
Arguments to the effect that the naïve view of time is inherently contradictory in 
virtue of containing within it the idea of the passage or flow of time are in fact long-
standing within philosophy (McTaggart, 1908; Bardon, 2013). Price (2011) has 
argued that the basic problem with any picture of time involving that idea is that it 
wants to be exclusive and inclusive at the same time. The picture is exclusive insofar 
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as one moment in time is supposed to enjoy some form of objective privilege in virtue 
of being the one moment in time that is present. Yet it is also supposed to be part of 
the picture that which moment in time is present changes, meaning that more than one 
moment in time gets to be present. This implies inclusivity rather than exclusivity: 
because each moment in time gets to be present when its time comes, no one moment 
can be objectively privileged. That is, each moment in time is just on a par with all 
others in being the present moment in time when it is that moment in time. One might 
try to respond to this by holding on to the claim that the present moment is special, 
but also claim that which moment is present depends on what time it is. The difficulty 
with responding in this way is that it makes which moment in time is present 
dependent on what time it is considered from, rather than it being an objective 
property of time which moment is present. This difficulty becomes clear if one returns 
to the case of space. One could say in a similar way that the place indicated by ‘here’ 
is special in some sense, e.g., because it is the place that the person referring to ‘here’ 
is located in. Clearly, different places then get to be special in that sense as the 
speaker moves around (and other places get to be special for other people). But this 
means that their specialness does not stem from something objective about the spatial 
locations themselves, their specialness is simply a matter of perspective. Thus, 
accepting that which moment in time is present is similarly just a matter of 
perspective requires giving up on the idea ‘objective now’ and with it the idea of the 
passage or flow of time.   
  
In as far as the naïve theory of time, and more specifically the idea that time passes or 
flows, does indeed involve a set of simultaneous contradictory beliefs along these 
lines, how might the dual systems account of temporal cognition we have outlined 
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account for how they arise? The picture of time that Price describes as ‘inclusive’ is 
one on which all times are indeed on a par with one another and events and states of 
affairs are thought of in a way that is temporally qualified: they are thought of as 
taking place or obtaining at certain times, with other events or states of affairs taking 
place or obtaining at other times in exactly the same manner. This is broadly speaking 
the kind of way of thinking about time people employ when using the temporal 
reasoning system, in which time is thought of as a linear dimension along which 
reality is extended. Some of the key manifestations of this type of thinking are the 
ability to use a clock-and-calendar system and the ability to engage in MTT. Using 
the temporal reasoning system can enable people to recognize that the present does 
not really have an objectively special status, and that thinking of certain events as 
present is actually simply a matter of locating them with respect to one out of many 
possible perspectives on time, just as thinking of a place as ‘here’ is a matter of 
locating it with respect to one out of many possible perspectives on space. 
 
Insofar as the idea of there being one objectively privileged present moment in time 
nevertheless also figures in everyday thinking about time, we want to suggest, its 
source is a residual tendency people still have to think of the world using the other, 
less sophisticated temporal updating system (see also Falk, 2003, and Prosser, 2006, 
for related ideas). How exactly might the existence of the temporal updating system 
explain the sense in which it seems to people that the present somehow has a 
privileged status? When the latter idea is discussed in the literature on the 
metaphysics of time, it is sometimes further specified as the idea that people have an 
impression that present things exist simpliciter, without temporal qualification (Skow, 
2011; Zimmerman 2005). That is to say, it is not that people’s impression is that past 
52 
 
 
and future things do exist, just not right now in the present. Rather, the impression is 
that past and future things simply do not exist at all – only present things do.  As we 
have seen, representing present things in a way that is not temporally qualified is also 
a feature of the model of the world maintained by temporal updating system. It is a 
model of the world that concerns the world only ever as it is at present. When that 
model is updated in response to a change in input it is simply replaced by a new 
model, with nothing in the new model representing that things were previously 
different from how they are now. But this implies that each model fails to identify the 
then-current situation as only one amongst many, temporally speaking. Nothing 
within the system signals that its representations represent just how things are at one 
time, with there also being other times at which things are different. In this way, the 
operation of the temporal updating system might explain a bias people have towards 
thinking that there is only one objectively present moment in time and that only what 
is present exists or is real. People seem to have this bias even though they can also 
recognize, using the temporal reasoning system, that what they think of as the present 
is only one perspective onto time amongst many others. In this way, the operation of 
the dual systems gives rise to contradictory elements in people’s naïve theory of time.  
 
Note that the issue here is not just one of diagnosing a contradiction implicit in 
people’s everyday thinking about time and providing an explanation of it. Unlike 
most other contradictions, in this case the contradiction does not simply get 
eliminated when people notice it. Philosophers who have come to the firm conviction 
that time does not really pass or flow, or even that the idea of time as passing or 
flowing is incoherent, frequently admit that they nevertheless still have this 
impression of time (for one example, see Ismael, 2017, p. 35). Similarly, even 
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Einstein, who saw clearly that his physics ruled out any ‘objective now’, continued to 
be troubled by what he called the “problem of the Now” (Carnap 1963, p. 37). It is the 
phenomenon of ‘simultaneous contradictory beliefs’ in this more specific sense that 
dual system accounts have been claimed to be able to be particularly well suited to 
explain (Sloman, 1996).    
 
5. The two systems and intertemporal choice 
We now turn to one final area of research that we think our dual systems account of 
temporal cognition can bear on in interesting ways, which is research on intertemporal 
choice (i.e., choices that involve assessing the relative value of rewards available at 
different time points). The idea that some form of dual systems view might usefully 
be brought to bear in explaining some of the phenomena surrounding intertemporal 
choice can already be found in the existing literature. Perhaps the most influential 
two-systems approach to intertemporal choice is Metcalfe and Mischel’s (1999) 
hot/cool systems analysis of delayed gratification. However, their distinction is one 
between an emotional system and a cognitive system, whereas we have drawn a 
distinction between two different cognitive systems: one for temporal updating and 
one for temporal reasoning. Our aim is therefore not to replace their distinction or 
similar existing dual process approaches to delayed gratification. Rather, the idea of 
two different cognitive systems that deal with how things unfold over time might 
provide us with a more fleshed-out picture of how exactly the processes already 
appealed to in the existing literature might be involved in delayed gratification. In this 
section, we want to argue that the two different systems provide for two quite 
different types of mechanisms that might facilitate delay of gratification. Note that our 
aim is simply to describe these two possible mechanisms for delaying gratification, 
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and how they relate to the distinction between the temporal updating system and the 
temporal reasoning system; we do not attempt to explain the broad set of phenomena 
that have been extensively studied under the heading of intertemporal choice (e.g., the 
shape of the temporal discounting curve).  
 
The first, more basic, form of delayed gratification might be illustrated by considering 
a proposal Boyer (2008) has put forward concerning what he sees as the function of 
future episodic thinking. Boyer thinks that simulation of future outcomes “can act as a 
calibration device by triggering emotional rewards that accurately reflect the 
emotional impact of [these outcomes] and are immediate and, therefore, bypass the 
usual discounting of future consequences of actions” (Boyer, 2008, p. 221). That is, 
mentally ‘pre-experiencing’ the reward allows people to give it due weight in their 
decision making and avoid discounting. Boyer advertises this as a way in which 
future episodic thinking can aid delaying gratification. Interestingly, though, its net 
effect could actually also be described as that of diminishing the relevance of time by 
allowing the chooser to ‘pre-experience’ the reward. Whilst it is true that the 
mechanism is triggered through a representation of the future reward, and in this 
sense involves temporal reasoning, we want to suggest that the subsequent effect of 
simulating that reward is actually to bring it within the purview of the model of the 
world maintained by the temporal updating system. The reward can then figure within 
that model as a more valued alternative to the immediately obtainable award, 
motivating the chooser to take steps to obtain it instead. To flesh out this idea further, 
we can draw on some features of the temporal updating system that we have already 
noted. 
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As we explained, the model of the environment maintained by the temporal updating 
system is best understood as a model in which time simply does not figure. Thus, 
there is no way for a future reward to figure in that model as such, i.e. as one that 
exists, but at a time different from the present. However, things can figure in the 
model of the world maintained by the temporal updating system even if they are not 
immediately accessible. For instance, the model may represent a reward as existing in 
the environment, even though it may not be obtainable immediately, e.g., because it is 
not within current sensory scope. We hypothesize that simulating a future reward, in 
the way envisaged by Boyer, allows the chooser to represent the (de facto) delayed 
reward in its model of the world in this way: both the delayed and the immediate 
reward are represented as potential objects for present choice, thus overcoming the 
discounting of the future that normally comes with using the temporal updating 
system. Note, though, that we are not arguing that this way of overcoming 
discounting requires only the temporal updating system. The temporal reasoning 
system is required because it triggers the project of simulating the future reward; the 
updating system itself does not represent future states of affairs. However, once the 
future reward is simulated, it can then feature in the model of the world used by the 
temporal updating system as an available choice.    
 
We want to distinguish this first way of mitigating temporal discounting, which 
primarily exploits cognitive resources available within the temporal updating system, 
from a second, more sophisticated one, in which temporal reasoning plays a much 
more central role. Put briefly, the key distinction might be put as follows: The kind of 
mechanism just described involves the chooser representing two choice objects – an 
immediately available smaller reward and a not immediately available larger reward – 
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and putting themselves into a position to be able to weigh them up against each other 
by bringing both of them within the purview of the model of the world maintained by 
the temporal updating system. In delayed gratification involving temporal reasoning, 
by contrast, it is not just such individual choice objects that are weighed up against 
each other; rather, what becomes a matter of choice is how the chooser wants events 
in their future to unfold over time. Specifically, they need to decide how they want 
rewards to be distributed over the time line that they represent as stretching out into 
the future, and in this sense they are reasoning about time itself. As we might also put 
it, whereas the mechanism we have previously described allows the agent to give the 
future reward due weight through setting aside its futurity, temporal reasoning can 
mitigate discounting by allowing the agent to give the future itself due weight in their 
deliberations.  
 
In the preceding section, we described the picture of time that the temporal reasoning 
system operates with as an inclusive picture of time, following Price, on which 
different times are seen as being on a par with one another, rather than one time, the 
present, having a special status. This feature of temporal reasoning, we want to 
suggest, is what allows agents to switch from simply trading individual rewards off 
against each other to considering how they want rewards to be distributed over the 
time line stretching out into the future. There are a number of different factors that 
have already been shown to impact on intertemporal choice which might be seen to 
affect it through facilitating reasoning about time in this way. 
 
For instance, using a number of different real-life measures such as saving for 
retirement, adopting a healthy lifestyle and practising safe sex, Chen (2013) has 
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shown that speakers of languages that allow for future events to be spoken of in the 
same grammatical forms as present events show more future-oriented behavior than 
speakers of languages that require a grammatical future marker. It is unlikely that this 
is due to the former simply ignoring the difference between present and future events, 
or imagining future events as present and using a mechanism of the type described by 
Boyer to delay gratification. At least some of the prudential behaviors studied by 
Chen involve fairly complex long-term goals imagining the attainment of which is 
unlikely to have a strong immediate hedonic effect. Rather, we believe that what lies 
behind these findings is that languages with an obligatory future tense marker 
encourage a focus on the present, because they encourage thinking of future events as 
somehow having a different status than present ones. Languages which allow for 
thinking of future events in the same grammatical categories as present ones, by 
contrast, facilitate thinking of future events as having the same status as present ones, 
despite being temporally distant, and therefore as ones that ought to bear a similar 
weight in one’s deliberations. Other existing studies might be seen in a similar light. 
For instance, a number of studies that have followed up Boyer’s (2008) suggestion 
that episodic future thinking plays a special role in supporting delay of gratification 
(e.g., Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; Lin & Epstein, 2014; Peters & Büchel, 2010) 
have demonstrated that simply getting people to imagine the future per se (i.e., not 
just imagining rewarding events) reduces temporal discounting. Even simple 
manipulations that vary the way relevant future points in time are characterized, such 
as presenting them as dates rather than delays, impact on degree of discounting (Read, 
Frederick, Orsel, & Rahman, 2005).   
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Crucially, the temporal reasoning system allows individuals to think of their lives as 
temporally extended projects. This requires more than just an ability to trade 
individual momentary outcomes off each other, but the ability to think of such 
outcomes as forming a pattern through time that is consistent with the way they want 
to shape their lives. The broad idea that people’s current choices are influenced by 
how they want their lives to unfold over time has featured centrally in a number of 
different theoretical frameworks in social psychology (e.g., Markus & Nurius, 1986; 
Oyserman & James, 2011), and we will not defend this idea here. Rather, we want to 
emphasize the way of thinking about time that this involves, and the role that way of 
thinking of time therefore plays in intertemporal choice. 
  
On this picture, in deciding what choice is the best fit with how one wants the 
temporally extended project of one’s life to unfold, times are represented as unique, 
unrepeating points on a time line of one’s life, i.e., as what we have termed above as 
particular times. This becomes vivid if we consider that, in some circumstances, what 
makes intertemporal choices important is the lack of an opportunity to revisit them 
(e.g., deciding whether to spend now rather than save for one’s pension, deciding 
whether to have children). When making intertemporal choices using the temporal 
reasoning system, choice points are considered as bifurcation points in linear time, 
with choices determining whether one’s life unfolds one way or another. This can 
indeed sometimes result in the decision to delay gratification, but notably this second 
mechanism for mitigating temporal discounting is in an important way more flexible 
than the first one we described involving the temporal updating system. As pointed 
out by Bulley, Henry, and Suddendorf (2016), depending on how the future is likely 
to unfold, it may sometimes be the right choice to take the smaller, sooner reward 
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instead of waiting (perhaps in vain) for the larger, later one. Thus, whilst temporal 
reasoning can facilitate delay gratification, it might also sometimes make it apparent 
that it is better to ‘seize the day’.  
 
In this section, we have distinguished between two mechanisms facilitating delay of 
gratification – one that relies on the temporal updating system by bringing the future 
reward into the current model of world, and one that relies on the temporal reasoning 
system by allowing people to think about their lives as time lines along which they 
decide to have a particular temporal profile of reward. This raises important questions 
about the circumstances in which these mechanisms might be put to use, and about 
how they are related to each other. With regard to facilitating delay of gratification, 
we do not view these mechanisms as typically being in conflict with each other. 
Indeed, we have stressed that the first mechanism draws on the temporal reasoning 
system to initiate a simulation of a future reward that can then fall under the purview 
of the temporal updating system. Which mechanism is effective in helping people 
delay gratification may depend on the nature of the choice. For example, it may be 
that it is particularly helpful to delay gratification of purely hedonic rewards by 
imagining those future rewards as actually present right now, whereas delay of 
gratification for rewards that are meaningful primarily in the larger context of one’s 
life or individual identity might be best facilitated by thinking about one’s life as a 
temporally extended project. There also may be group or individual differences; for 
example, amnesic patients who lack the ability to engage in detailed simulation of 
future events may base their intertemporal choices primarily on reasoning about the 
time line of their future lives (this type of reasoning appears to be intact in such 
patients; Craver, Kwan, Steindam, & Rosenbaum, 2014). 
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6. Concluding remarks 
We have argued that our dual systems approach helps to shed light on a variety of 
issues ranging from how to characterize animal cognition to the metaphysical 
assumptions that seem to be part of people’s naïve theory of time.  
  
We have sided with those who reject the idea that animals are capable of mental time 
travel, arguing that animals are not capable of thinking about the past or the future at 
all. Part of what motivates our arguments is the idea that it is at least not obvious how 
much use animals would have for the idea of particular past and future times different 
from the present (on this, see also Campbell, 1996). What we have said in this paper 
does imply that there are some benefits that come with being able to engage in 
temporal reasoning, for instance when it comes to dealing with situations in which 
information about successive changes is received in a different order from the one in 
which they happened. However, we hypothesize that temporal reasoning abilities 
have not evolved in animals because opportunities to benefit from knowing that a 
situation of a particular kind obtained at a unique time in the past are relatively rare, 
since that time itself will never come around again. By contrast, there are obvious 
benefits in possessing a general learning system geared towards encoding and 
retaining information about regular, stable, or reoccurring features of the 
environment, because such information may be of use on numerous occasions when 
these features are encountered again.  
  
As humans, we have developed the ability to make time itself an object of thought, to 
think of the world as extended in four dimensions, one of which is the temporal one. 
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Given what we have just said, we think it is right that questions as to the primary 
adaptive function that this ability has evolved to serve in humans’ lives have recently 
started to attract researchers’ attention (see, e.g., Mahr & Csibra, 2018). However, as 
we have tried to argue, there are also reasons for thinking that the more primitive 
temporal updating system that animals rely on in negotiating the world, in which time 
is not represented, is still active in humans too, alongside the capacity for temporal 
reasoning. And this may be part of the explanation as to why time remains to be a 
phenomenon we can get deeply puzzled by.    
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